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  This paper examines whether school districts, and individual schools, respond to ratings 
from the accountability system by reallocating resources across or within schools. Our empirical 
work follows three identification strategies, a regression discontinuity for schools on the rating 
boundaries, a “rating shock” analysis for schools that face a change in rating when the state 
changed its accountability system, and a school fixed effects strategy. We find that school 
districts provided incentives for their schools to achieve higher ratings under the early 
accountability system, but under the later system they appear to have abandoned this strategy. In 
addition, the rating shock results suggest that some effort was directed towards assisting lower 
performing schools under the new regime. Finally, we find that in the early period incremental 
funds were used as much for ancillary purposes as instruction. 
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1. Introduction 
  Accountability systems have been fixtures of the US education system since the late 
1990’s. These systems, perhaps due to the pressures that arose out of state-wide equity standards, 
attempt to impose and publicize performance standards on schools. The primary role of these 
systems is to evaluate schools and assign simple ratings based primarily on student performance 
on statewide standardized tests. The ratings are clearly designed to be useful to parents. Figlio 
and Lucas (2004) find, for example, that there is a housing market response to the ratings in 
addition to measured learning output of schools, although this response seems to decline over 
time. Certainly if parents respond to school ratings, it is expected that school administrators 
would also use the ratings for allocation decisions. Even if parents do not respond to the ratings, 
however, school administrators may respond to other public pressures over actual or perceived 
school performance, and thus use the ratings to make resource allocation decisions. The goal of 
our research is to discern whether school administrators in fact use accountability ratings, by 
adjusting the allocation of resources in response. Our examination takes place on two levels. We 
first examine whether school districts change the allocation of resources between schools, by 
examining schools on the rating boundary. We additionally examine a wide variety of categories 
of spending and employee resources within schools. We find that in the early Texas 
accountability system school districts provided incentives to reward successful schools, but in 
the later reformed system the only response is to provide extra resources to schools with lower 
ratings. Similarly, we find that schools during the early period spread the incremental resources 
across categories of expenditure, which may include instructional spending, but particularly  
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increased spending on extra-curricular and athletic activities. Conversely, in the later period, 
incremental resources for lower rated schools were directed towards instruction. 
  Given that many researchers have found that schools have responded to accountability 
systems, it would be consistent to find resource allocation consequences. Incentives in some 
states, for example, are to support poorly performing schools. In other states the ratings serve 
only to provide easily accessible information to the community.
2 Economists have studied the 
extent to which schools respond to accountability systems by trying to increase test scores, and 
recent work has shown that schools do achieve this goal (Chakrabarti, 2007, 2008; Carnoy and 
Loeb, 2003; Hanushek and Raymond, 2004, 2005; Jacob, 2005). Researchers have also found, 
however, that some of these gains may be due to schools “gaming” the system (Cullen and 
Reback, 2006; Figlio, 2006; Figlio and Getzler, 2002; Figlio and Winicki, 2005; Jacob, 2005) or 
focusing on marginal students (Chakrabarti, 2007; Neal and Schazenbach, forthcoming).  
  Thus, while we know that schools respond to accountability in some finely detailed ways, 
we know little about the resource allocation response between or within schools. Understanding 
the resource response provides an important view of the incentives inherent in accountability 
systems, and also highlights that reallocations can potentially affect all students within a school, 
not simply those marginal students that affect a school’s rating. While Rouse, Hannaway, 
Goldhaber, and Figlio (2007) provide evidence from a survey of schools that identify a number 
of policy changes that are induced by low ratings, there is very little evidence on how schools 
and districts re-allocate resources when they get lower ratings. Bacolod, Dinardo and Jacobson 
(2009) find that schools that receive rewards for higher ratings generally put the money into  
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teacher bonuses. Jacob (2003) looks at how school resources in Chicago adjust to the imposition 
of an accountability system, and finds shifts in expenditures to non-ancillary instruction amongst 
schools with low pre-accountability test scores but overall, he finds little change. Neither of these 
papers, however, look at resource allocation responses directly to the attainment of ratings. The 
one exception is Chiang (2009) who finds some evidence that schools who receive a “failing” 
grade in Florida increase spending on instruction and instructional tools. Nonetheless he only 
considers elementary schools for a single year.  In this paper, we take much broader look at 
resource allocation responses to accountability - considering the response under two different 
accountability regimes and along different points of the rating distribution via multiple 
identification strategies. 
  Our investigation into the resource allocation response focuses on schools on rating 
boundaries. Accountability standards in Texas consist of clear demarcation based on the pass 
rates of students on a standardized exam administered by the state, along with attendance, 
dropout, and school completion rates. There are four ratings, exemplary (E), recognized (R), 
acceptable (A), and low performing (L).
3 Higher scores by one student do not compensate for 
lower scores by another; the criteria are solely based on whether a student scores higher than a 
minimum on the exam.
4 We thus use fluctuations in school ratings based on these criteria in 
three ways. First, we employ a regression discontinuity (RD) framework to account for schools 
on the boundary between each of the four ratings. Since there are random factors out of schools’ 
 
2 Prior to recent court cases, students in Florida were eligible for vouchers to attend private schools providing a 
potentially strong punishment for poorly performing schools. On the other hand, in Texas punishments such as a 
school reconstitution are very rarely imposed making the system almost purely reputational. 
3 The “Low Performing” rating under the early accountability system was renamed to “Academically Unacceptable” 
under the later system. 
4 While they do not factor into the accountability ratings, schools with large percentages of students scoring at the 
“commended” performance level receive additional recognition.  
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control which partially determine student outcomes, schools that just barely receive a higher 
rating should be a valid comparison group for schools that just barely receive a lower rating 
(Lee, 2008). Our second analysis method exploits the “rating shock” that resulted when Texas 
implemented a more rigorous rating method in the middle of our period of analysis (Figlio and 
Kenny, 2009). The rating shock method examines budgetary changes in schools where the new 
system results in a decline in the rating. Third, we provide an analysis that identifies the effects 
of ratings on budget allocation using school fixed-effects. While this strategy allows a more 
general context since it uses all schools, it relies on the considerably stronger assumption that 
school ratings are uncorrelated with time-varying unobservable characteristics. Nonetheless, this 
strategy provides broadly similar results to our other two strategies.  
  Our findings show that the school districts in Texas provided additional resources to 
higher rated schools as an incentive device in the early period from 1997-2002. However, this 
strategy was abandoned when the state switched accountability systems starting in the 2003-04 
school year. Further, we find some evidence that the school districts even reversed course under 
the new system and started to provide assistance to lower rated schools. 
 
2. Texas Accountability Systems 
  Texas initiated one of the first educational accountability systems in 1993, called the 
Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS). Under TAAS schools were given ratings - from 
highest to lowest - of Exemplary (E), Recognized, (R), Acceptable (A), and Low Performing 
(L).
5 Table 1 shows the distribution of ratings by year. Very few schools receive an L rating 
 
5 In both of the accountability systems, alternative schools have the option of being evaluated under a separate 
system. Some schools with small populations are also rated using a subjective procedure called “special analysis.”  
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under TAAS, and overall the number of schools receiving R and E ratings rose until the end of 
TAAS in 2002. After a one year transition, the new accountability system called Texas 
Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) was implemented for the 2003-04 year. Under 
TAKS, the ratings distribution shifted downwards as fewer schools were awarded E’s and more 
were rated L or A. 
  A school’s accountability rating under TAAS is based on the share of tested students who 
pass the state-wide exam based on separate student groups in each subject. The groups are all 
tested students along with four subgroups - white, African-American, Hispanic, and 
economically disadvantaged. The subjects are math, reading, writing, and social studies (only for 
8
th grade). Dropout rates and attendance could also affect the rating.
6 Thus the system is based 
on test score levels rather than student gains, and the rating is determined by the lowest 
performing subject-group of sufficient size. Appendix Table 1 provides a description of the 
requirements for achieving each rating in the years of our analysis.
7 With the exception of 
receiving a low rating, there were no direct punishments imposed on schools by the state, and 
state awards for high performance were extremely small.
8 Schools that received an L were 
subject to additional oversight and students were given the right to transfer to other schools, 
although state law did not impose financial consequences. There was a risk of closure for being 
 
Further some small schools were rated based on the performance of a nearby “paired” school rather than their own. 
We drop schools identified by the Texas Education Agency as being subject to one of these provisions from the 
analysis. 
6 The attendance requirements were abandoned in 1999-2000. 
7 More detail on the rules underlying the Texas accountability system can be found via the Texas Education Agency 
at http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/account/. 
8 Schools receiving an E or R rating, along with some A schools that made large gains, were eligible for financial 
awards. In 2000-2001, which was the last year the award system was fully funded, the award was provided at a rate 
of $7.20 per enrolled student up to a maximum award of $5000 per school.  Average per-student expenditure that 
year amongst rated schools was $5490.  Hence these awards too small to have more than a negligible effect on our 




 in TAKS is much less likely, while repeating an L 
rating i
rated L for two or more consecutive years, although this affected very few schools as only 0.3% 
of all schools received an L rating two years in a row from 1998-99 to 2001-02. Thus, the rating 
system primarily acted as a reputation based system based on the public response, unless school 
districts themselves developed internal penalties or rewards based on the rating. Table 2 shows 
the transition matrix averaged over the years of TAAS, and shows schools often change ratings 
from year to year with only 69% of A’s, 54% of R’s, and 71% of E’s maintaining their ratings 
the following year. On average ratings fall for 13% - 16% of schools and rise for 19% - 25% of 
schools. This upward drift over time contributed to implementation of a new accountabil
sy  starting in 2003. 
  The 2002-03 school year served as a transition period between the old system and the 
new system based on the TAKS exam. Under TAKS schools faced a similar rating system with 
four ratings - Exemplary (E), Recognized (R), Academically Acceptable (A), and Academically 
Unacceptable (L). Table 1 shows that the likelihood of an L rating, while still very low, triples 
compared to the earlier TAAS period while the likelihood of an E rating falls dramatically. Table 
2 similarly shows that maintaining an E rating
s much more likely than under TAAS. 
The TAKS system is structured similarly to TAAS but with a more difficult exam, some 
additional requirements for special education students and completions, and stricter passing 
requirements. Details on the requirements are provided in Appendix Table 2. As a result of the 
increased stringency, many schools experienced a drop in their rating after the transition, a 
situation we will exploit in our analysis. Punishments for low performing schools under TAKS  
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were st ngthened, and include an option to “reconstitute” a school via mass layoffs and rehiring 
wo consecutive years. 
hools as a result of the new exam in TAKS, compared to TAAS. 
ur final strategy uses all of the available data, but relies on school fixed effects to separate the 
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3. Empirical Methodology 
  Our examination of school district behavior is through the total operating expenses made 
available to each school. That is, the total budget available to each school in the district 
presumably reflects the school district’s allocation strategy. On the other hand, we view the 
allocation of funds among categories of expenditure within each school as a reduced form 
potentially reflecting the preferences of both the school district, and the individual school 
principals.
9 We use all three of our empirical strategies on both aspects of potential resource 
reallocation due to ratings. Our RD strategy is segmented by each of the separate accountability 
systems, and is focused on schools near the rating borders. The rating shock strategy exploits the 
potential drop in rating facing sc
O
impact of ratings on resources. 
 
3.1. Regression Discontinuity Strategy 
  The key to the RD strategy is to define the margin that influences the response to the 
accountability rating. We believe that costs are most likely to influence school decisions, and 
thus we use the number of students for whom a change in test score could modify the school’s 
 
9 An important related question is whether the test score gains represent actual improvements in learning, or are 
simply a result of other strategies. It may be that educational administrators’ view of the answers to this question is 
reflected in the extent to which they view accountability as a useful piece of information for making resource 
allocation decisions.  
9 
ol to rise one rating (Nb). For dropouts and 
completions we use the number of students in each subject-group cell that need to stay in school 
to change the rating. The measure of Nb is therefore: 
) ×
ups that, if they were to be rated individually, would have the same 
ting as the school as a whole.
10 The second indicator function limits the summation to subject-
cutoff we measure Na as 
 
rating. We further restrict our definition of boundary to identify schools which require 
improvement by test takers in a single subject/student group cell. With this definition, schools 
with the same distance from the boundary on one side should face similar costs of adjustment. 
For dropouts and completions we use the number of students in a single subject-group cell that 
would have to pass the exam, but did not, for a scho
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where  s is the test subject or performance measure, g is the student group (by race, 
disadvantaged, or total), Rating is the school’s accountability rating, Ratingsg is the rating for the 
subject-group, and Nsg is the number of additional students in group g who need to pass 




                                                 
10 Since the overall school rating is based on the lowest rated subject-group, no group that counts towards the rating 
would have a rating lower than the school-wide rating. Nonetheless, under TAKS schools are given a limited 
number of exceptions for groups that perform poorly. Since these subject-groups do not count towards the ratings 
we do not include them in our calculation of Nb.  
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where Nsg refers to the number of students in a subject-group cell who would need to switch
passing to failing the performance measure to reach the cutoff for the next lower rating. As 
before, the two indicator functions identify subject group cell
( )( ) (2)  min11asgsgsgsg NRatingRatingSizeMinN⎡
, sg
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school’s rating, and that meet the minimum size standards.
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  Thus we conduct a regression-discontinuity of schools whose Na or Nb a
fo
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for school i in year t where Ri,t+1 is the school specific resource in category i (either dollars per 
student or inputs per student) the year after the school receives a rating, Na and Nb as defined by 
(1) and (2) above, and Above is a dummy variable indicating whether the school is above the 
rating threshold. We use bandwidths selected through leave-one-out cross validation.
12 As 
suggested in Lee and Lemieux (2009), we use a rectangular kernel that involves limiting the 
sample to narrow bands around the cutoffs without re-weighting the data.
13 To explore whether 
schools and districts may react differently to receiving different ratings, we run (3) separately for 
 
11 In some years a school could achieve a higher rating using year-on-year increases in performance measures if they 
do not score high enough to meet the requirements, called required improvement (RI). In these cases we calculate Nb 
using whichever method, RI or standard, that brings that subject-group closer to the cutoff. Similarly, we use the RI 
calculation for Na if a school achieves a higher rating due to RI in the marginal group. 
12 Specifically, we select the margin that minimizes the mean squared error by repeatedly estimating the model for 
“all but one” of the observations with a wide variety of margins. Nonetheless, we have also estimated (3) using 
parametric techniques with a 5-order and a 3-order polynomial, and using bandwidths one unit higher and one unit 
lower than the cross-validation bandwidths. In all of these cases we find qualitatively similar results suggesting that 
our estimates are robust to the choice of bandwidths or functional form. These results are provided in the online 
appendix. 
13 Lee and Lemieux (2009) argue that more complex kernels provide only marginal improvements in efficiency.  
11 
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between the two systems, as schools gave the new TAKS test in the year after TAAS, but the 
                                                
each boundary - between L and A schools (the LA boundary), between A and R schools (the AR 
boundary), and between R and E schools (the RE boundary). Our results are based on estimates 
of  β3, the impact of being above the given boundary. Since the RD estimates result from 
marginal (random) changes in rating outcomes, the resulting estimate illuminates the response by 
either schools or school districts to a change in information revealed to the public, and not 
necessarily the response to an actual or perceived change in school quality. Figure 1 shows the 
first stage after the adjustments described above.  At each boundary, there is a clear discontinuity 
in the rating whereby almost 100% of schools with Na ≥ 0 an
n
 
3.2. Rating Shock Strategy 
  As an alternative strategy to determine the budgetary response to school accountability 
ratings, we examine the transition period between the first accountability system in Texas, 
TAAS, to the newer system, TAKS. In particular, we test how schools that faced a rating 
reduction reallocated their budget for the first year in which the new TAKS system was 
implemented. This is similar to the strategy used by Figlio and Kenny (2009) due to a change in 
regimes. The TAKS system is designed to be more rigorous than TAAS in two dimensions. First, 
the exam given to students is intended to be more challenging and broader across academic 
material. Second, additional categories of evaluation for completions and test performance of 
special education students were added. Our empirical examination is based on the transition year 
 
14 Given these results, we rely on a “strict” RD design.  Nonetheless estimates using a “fuzzy” design were nearly 
identical and are available in the online appendix.  
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results were not publicized.
15 As a result, schools received good information about their 
performance and hence their new rating, and had the opportunity to alter their behavior in 
response. Since the TAKS exam was given for the first time, the information provided by the test 
results (the “rating shock”) is plausibly exogenous and thus our estimates of the budgetary 
response are more likely to be unbiased. Controlling for the rating under the older TAAS system, 
we look for resource reallocations if a school projects using data from the transition year of 
2002-03 that its rating will fall in the new system.
16 Like the RD results, our test of the effect 
from the shock of potentially lower accountability ratings is a test of the response of the school 
to a change in information provided to the community, rather than a change in actual output of 
the school. Unlike the RD strategy, however, since schools were not given an official rating, it is 
unlikely that any award system would be in place during this period. A further advantage of the 
rating shock strategy is that the RD provides a local average treatment effect only on the impact 
of ratings for marginal schools, while the rating shock strategy addresses a somewhat broader 
array of schools.
17  
  The regression we run using the rating shock in the transition is therefore the change in 
total expenditures, categorical expenditures, or staffing from the 2002-03 school year to the 
2003-04 school year based on whether the school projected that its accountability rating would 
 
15 Results of the testing were later provided as data releases which allow us to approximate what the schools’ ratings 
would have been. There were no school report cards released, however, for the general public to evaluate schools. 
16 There was also uncertainty because the new criteria for translating pass rates to accountability ratings were not yet 
known. Nonetheless, we assume that school districts were able to approximate the new requirements prior to 
finalizing their expenditure decisions; hence we use the new (2003-04) rules to estimate the 2002-03 ratings.  
17 Below we provide a test for whether “marginal” schools are treated differently than infra-marginal schools. This 
test suggests the RD analysis captures the behavioral responses of schools and districts to ratings.  
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drop from its rating in 2001-02, the last year of the TAAS system.
18 Further, while controlling 
for the 2001-02 TAAS rating we interact an indicator for whether the rating falls with the rating 
the school is predicted to receive, so that we can identify whether falling to a lower predicted 
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where ΔR is the change in resources per student in a given category from the gap year (2002-03) 
to the next, either expenditures or employees for school i. X is a set of school characteristics 
including the percent of enrollment in each grade, percent of enrollment by racial category, and 
the percent of enrollment identified as economically disadvantaged. Rating_L, Rating_R, and 
Rating_E are indicator variables for whether school i received a rating of L, R, or E in the 
subscripted year. Our measure of a rating shock comes from the interaction of the predicted 
ratings with Fall - a dummy variable which equals one if scores during the gap year (2002-03) 
on the new test indicate the new TAKS rating will be lower than the last TAAS rating. We also 
control for a rise in rating, so that we compare schools whose ratings fall to those whose ratings 
remain the same. Hence our estimates compare schools that had the equivalent ratings in 2001-
02 but where one received the same predicted rating in 2002-03 while the other received a lower 
rating. Other than for L schools, which account for only 1% of our sample for this analysis, 
schools were much more likely to experience a drop rather than increase in their rating. Table 1 
 
18 Due to the new testing regime, applying the “required improvement” rules to the predicted ratings would be not be 
sensible as the passing rates on TAKS were considerably different from those under TAAS. Thus, we ignore  
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shows that while only 16% of schools saw a ratings drop in the last year of TAAS, the rating 
from the first year of the TAKS exam suggests roughly two-thirds of schools would experience 
reduced ratings, while less than 3% of schools were predicted to receive a higher rating. 
 
3.3. School Fixed Effects Estimation 
  As a final test of whether school accountability ratings affect resource allocations 
between and within schools, we estimate panel regressions from 1998-99 to 2006-07 separately 
for the two testing regimes with fixed effects for years and schools. As in the ratings shock 
analysis, we condition on the share of school enrollment in each grade, the racial and ethnic 
composition of the school, and the share of the students that are economically disadvantaged. 
Unlike the other methods, this strategy has the advantage of capturing the combined effect on 
resource allocation of both the signal provided by the rating to parents and the actual school 
quality underlying the rating. Nonetheless, the reliance on school fixed effects to identify the 
model implies that the estimates are unbiased only if there is no variation in omitted variables 
over time. Despite the dynamism of school populations, it is possible the included student 
characteristics successfully capture the relevant changes, leaving the core estimates of the impact 
on school accountability ratings informative of actual behavior of school administrators. 
 
4. Data 
  Our data covers all public schools in the state of Texas, and comes from three datasets 
provided by the Texas Education Agency (TEA). First is the Academic Excellence Indicator 
System (AEIS) which provides data on staffing, enrollment, and student demographics. Second 
 
required improvement here.  
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is the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) financial reports which 
provide expenditure data by category.
19 We examine total expenditures, four functions, five 
programs, and hiring in three categories of employees. Third is the TEA accountability reports 
which provides the data that is used to calculate accountability ratings.
20 
  The PEIMS resource data contains school-level expenditures classified by functions, and 
programs. The four functions are aggregated into instruction; leadership, curriculum and staff 
development; counseling and social work services; and extra-curricular activities. The five 
programs are basic instruction; special interventions (called accelerated and alternative education 
by TEA); gifted and talented; career and technology; and athletics.
21 The AEIS data provides 
full-time equivalent staffing counts broken into teachers, aides, and administration. We 
normalize all of the variables by enrollment. 
  The RD regressions, as well as the fixed effects regressions, are pooled across years 
within each accountability system. Since some schools appear multiple times, we cluster 
standard errors by school. In all our analyses we drop alternative schools, which generally are 
targeted to specific groups of students, and which operate under a separate accountability system. 
Similarly, we drop charter schools, since they also are targeted at specific groups of students and 
have separate state aid and budgeting rules. We also drop schools that do not receive their own 
rating due to being “paired” with another school, schools that are identified as undergoing 
“special analysis” which is a subjective rating system for small schools, and schools which have 
 
19 We use the actual expenditures by schools rather than budgeted expenditures. 
20 All data sources are publically available on the website for the Texas Education Agency. 
21  Special interventions primarily include assistance provided to low-performing and at-risk students.  The 
definitions for programs changed slightly starting in the 2002 school year.  Fortunately, this coincides with the 
change in the accountability systems which we estimate separately, so there is no impact on the empirical work.  
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fewer than 200 students, to avoid errors in calculating margins due to some masked data.
22 After 
these restrictions, we have 26,500 school-year observations for TAAS and 23,168 for TAKS.  
  Table 3 presents the means of school characteristic data for each of the two accountability 
regimes. Schools with higher ratings tend to have fewer minorities, disadvantaged, LEP, and 
special education students as well as smaller enrollments. Table 4 provides summary statistics 
for resources in the year after a school receives a rating. Under both accountability regimes 
schools with lower ratings have higher expenditures than those with higher ratings, although this 
gap widens in TAKS.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5A. Regression Discontinuity 
  Table 5 presents the RD results for school district behavior for three alternative 
bandwidths, by illustrating how school districts alter total spending per student for schools that 
are just above a rating border, compared to schools that are just below. The results in panel A, 
for TAAS, show estimates that are consistently positive, indicating that school districts reward 
schools that are just above the border on all three margins. The magnitude of the estimates 
suggests a considerably larger reward for A compared to L schools than on the other two 
borders. The point estimate on the LA border of $347 is about 6.8% of the average spending by 
A rated schools ($5,075), although it is not significant at conventional levels. Small variation in 
the bandwidths produce estimates that are larger in magnitude with similar standard errors, hence 
we interpret the bulk of the evidence as indicating rewards are produced by school districts for 
 
22 Student counts in the accountability reports are masked when sample sizes are too small, generally fewer than 5 
students.  
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schools that successfully jump their specific rating boundary. The pattern of the LA border is 
repeated for the AR border, and the estimates are consistently positive for the RE border. Thus 
while the rewards for success are much smaller at the two higher boundaries, the evidence shows 
a consistent pattern in TAAS of school districts providing rewards to successful schools as 
indicated by the school rating.  
  Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of these results. The figure provides the 
average expenditure level for the number of students below and above the boundary along with a 
fitted polynomial from local linear regressions. The figures generally support the empirical 
results, in that the discontinuity is much more pronounced for the LA and AR borders, while the 
RE border results disappear rapidly with distance from the border.  
  In panel B of Table 5 we see that the implicit rewards in TAAS for success at the border 
have completely disappeared for TAKS. To the extent school districts use the accountability 
rating results to affect resource allocations in TAAS, they no longer do so with the newer 
accountability system. Figure 3 graphically presents the same information - that there are no 
evident discontinuities on the boundaries. We believe it unlikely that the stricter environment in 
TAKS is responsible for the change, in that while L schools faced a larger administrative 
penalty, other schools did not. Thus it seems more likely that school districts abandoned the 
implicit reward structure because they found it was not successful, although our estimates cannot 
distinguish the actual cause of the change in behavior.
23 
 
23 To the extent school districts represent derived demand, this implies parents did not find the ratings useful.  
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  Table 6 provides estimates of how ratings affect different expenditure and staffing 
categories under TAAS.
24 In general, the impact of higher ratings on each individual expenditure 
category is relatively small, suggesting that schools dispersed the funding they were awarded 
from TAAS success across a variety of categories. We find significant increases in 
administration & training, as well as counseling, on the A/R and R/E boundary, and we find 
increases in gifted and talented spending on the A/R border. Nonetheless all of these are 
economically small, amounting to a total of $57 per-student for E schools and $48 per-student in 
R schools. A clearer story emerges when looking at the L/A boundary, although small sample 
sizes make the estimates rather imprecise. In this case it appears that a substantial portion of 
additional funds went into extra-curricular activities and instruction. “A” schools spent an 
additional $86 per-student on extra -curricular activities, a substantial increase over the $99 
average. Figure 4 highlights this increase - there is a clear jump in extra-curricular spending at 
the L/A boundary. Such a response is consistent with schools increasing their expenditures on 
categories unrelated to test-preparation as ratings increase and accountability pressures relax. 
Similarly expenditures on athletics are found to increase by $286 for highs schools, although the 
relatively small sample size warrants a cautious interpretation. Nonetheless, the extra spending 
on ancillaries is also accompanied for A schools by a substantial, although insignificant, increase 
in instruction expenditures of $347.
25 
  Table 7 presents the categorical spending results for the later system, TAKS. For A 
schools along the L/A boundary, the only marginally significant result is a drop in extra-
 
24 Regressions using bandwidths one above and one below the leave-one-out cross-validation optimal bandwidths 
were qualitatively similar and are provided in the online appendix.  
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curricular spending, the opposite of what we found for TAAS. For R schools along the A/R 
boundary there is an increase shown in counseling and G&T expenditures but a drop in athletics 
and student-teacher ratios increase (teachers fall). E schools are found to show a marginal 
increase in extra-curricular spending but also an increase in the student-aide ratio (aides fall). 
Hence, these results appear to confirm the theory that arose out of the total expenditure results 
that districts abandoned their reward systems under the TAKS regime, as we find no systematic 
return for being on the positive side of a rating boundary. 
  As a diagnostic test for the above results, Table 8 presents tests for discontinuities in the 
demographic variables, which ideally are randomly distributed around the rating cut-off. To 
conduct this test we use the optimal bandwidths for total expenditures.
26 In general we find there 
is no significant difference between schools above or below any boundary in % white or % 
disadvantaged. In addition, there appears to be no significant impact of the rating on the change 
in enrollment. 
  While this test generally supports the RD framework, there are a few cases nonetheless 
where there are estimated discontinuities. E schools near the R/E boundary in TAAS are found to 
have moderately higher enrollment than R schools. A similar result holds for R schools at the 
A/R boundary in TAKS. We note, however, that on average E schools in TAAS and R schools in 
TAKS have lower enrollment than R and A schools, respectively. Hence, at worst the R-D tends 
to overcompensate for enrollment differences along these boundaries. Additionally, the other 
four enrollment estimates are statistically insignificant. The other significant estimates are for % 
 
25 The one peculiar outcome is a large drop in career-tech expenditures of $500 per-student. However, as with 
athletics the sample size is very small and is sensitive to choice of bandwidth and hence this result may simply be 
spurious. Increasing the bandwidth by one reduces this figure to an insignificant -119.6(se 170.4). 
26 Results using the median bandwidth across all outcomes were similar.  
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black; R schools on the A/R boundary are found to have a higher share than A schools in TAAS 
and a lower share but more Hispanics in TAKS. These differences are small, however, as the 
difference in total in minority share does not exceed 1.9% in either case. 
  Another potential concern is that schools near a boundary may try to manipulate their 
accountability measures to get a higher rating. While such “gaming” likely occurs, this would not 
be a problem if at least some of the determinants of the distance from a ratings boundary, and by 
extension the rating itself, are random (Lee and Lemieux, 2009). In the online appendix we 
provide distributions for TAAS and TAKS, respectively. In both cases, the distributions seem to 
fit a smooth pattern except precisely at the boundary (N = 0) or just below it (N = -1), where N = 
0 is more likely than a smooth graph would predict and N = -1 is less likely. This pattern is more 
apparent in TAKS than in TAAS. We believe the pattern potentially results from some 
manipulation, but is also a product of the Rawlsian nature of the rating algorithm. In TAKS, 
schools were allowed a limited number of exceptions whereby some subject/student groups that 
would have given the school an L rating were not counted. Indeed, omitting the exceptions 
considerably reduces the discontinuity at the border. Hence to address this concern, since any 
manipulation appears to be precisely concentrated at N = 0 and N = -1, we conduct analyses 
using the CV optimal bandwidths dropping these marginal observations from the regressions. 
These results can be found in the online appendix, where we show there are only two coefficients 
significantly different when the N = 0 and N = -1 observations are dropped, and neither of these 
results are for total expenditures in TAAS. Rather, one is for extra-curricular on the AR border in 
TAAS, and the other is for instruction on the AR border in TAKS. Thus we believe our central 
results are not sensitive to the potential “gaming.”  
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  We conduct a number of additional specification tests provided in the online appendix. 
We find results that are generally similar to our baseline estimates when we restrict all 
bandwidths to the optimal bandwidth for total expenditures, when we limit the sample below a 
boundary to schools with one failing subject instead of a single failing subject-group, and when 
we use a 3 term or a 5 term polynomial instead of local-linear regressions. In addition, a small 
number of schools (less than 0.5%) are calculated to have ratings different from what their 
ratings actually were. This is because of masked data for small student-group cells, and an 
attendance category in the early years of TAAS that we were not able to incorporate into our 
rating calculation. Our main reported estimates minimize the effects of these attributes by 
dropping schools with less than 200 enrollees. Nonetheless, we further test our results by using 
the actual rating as the intercept term instead of our calculated rating, and use the calculated 
rating as an instrument. Results for this analysis are also similar to our baseline results. 
  Our final set of sensitivity analyses explores dividing the sample. Despite the relatively 
small numbers of middle and high schools, we split the sample by elementary and the aggregate 
of middle and high schools. This shows generally similar results across elementary and 
middle/high schools, with the exception of L/A in TAAS where most of the expenditure increase 
for A schools is found in middle/high schools, as is most of the increase in extra-curricular 
expenditures. These schools also experience a reduction in student-teacher ratios. Hence, most of 
the benefits here appear to accrue to middle/high schools although elementary schools show 
positive but insignificant estimates on instruction and regular program spending. The caution in 
these results is because despite pooling the middle and high schools, the sample sizes are much 
smaller than the overall results. Finally, we split our sample also by the large urban districts  
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(Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, Austin, Fort Worth, & El Paso) and other districts. Results were 
qualitatively similar for both types of districts. 
 
5b. Ratings Shock Results 
  Our second identification strategy is to use the potential unanticipated reduction in rating 
facing many schools from the transition between TAAS and TAKS, which we refer to as a 
“rating shock” as in Figlio and Kenny (2009). This rating shock arises because schools and 
districts did not know how they would be affected by the new exam until it was administered, 
and had a year to respond before the results were made public. Thus to perform the rating shock 
analysis we estimate the rating using test data from the gap year of 2002-03 and the thresholds 
actually adopted in 2003-04.
27 
  The regression results in Table 9 show the change in resources from the 2002-03 
transition year to the first official year of TAKS (2003-04) as a response to the reduction in the 
school rating, differentiated by the rating to which a school falls. The evidence suggests school 
districts responded to prop up schools which were threatened with a rating drop. Schools that 
were expected to fall to an A rating receive an average of $46 more per-student than otherwise. 
Most of this funding appears to go towards instruction ($45), which leads to a reduction in 
student-teacher ratios (teachers rise), and is also shown by the regular program results ($60). 
Notably, special interest students suffer a drop of $28 per student. For schools whose predicted 
rating falls to L, with the exception of total expenditures, the point estimates are in the same 
direction as those that fall to A for the categories listed above, albeit insignificant. Further, these 
 
27 We are thus assuming here that the schools and districts are able to anticipate the new rating criteria, and so could 
adjust their expenditures in response.  
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schools also experience an increase in student-teacher ratios.
28 Finally, for schools that fall to an 
R we find no statistically significant changes in any resource. 
 
5c. School Fixed Effects 
  Our third identification strategy is to use the entire panel of data but rely on school fixed-
effects to identify the impact of ratings. This strategy has the advantage of exploiting the entire 
data range rather than a sub-population of “marginal” schools. It has the substantial drawback, 
however, that it relies on stronger assumptions about the nature of unobserved covariates than 
the two procedures above. 
  Tables 10 and 11 provide the fixed effects estimates for TAAS and TAKS, respectively. 
The estimates are broadly consistent with our findings, in that districts apparently provide 
incentives to schools to increase their ratings under TAAS, and schools are found to use that 
money to fund ancillary programs. Under TAKS schools and districts instead provide additional 
funding to lower rated schools. For example, in Table 10 we see that under TAAS higher rated 
schools get a small and statistically insignificant amount of additional money overall but that 
there are significant, albeit small, increases in extra-curricular activities for higher rated schools. 
In Table 11 for TAKS, the estimates suggest that schools with L ratings receive more overall 
funding as well as more funding in administration and training, counseling, extra-curricular 
activities, and special interventions along with a lower student-teacher and student-administrator 
ratios. For other ratings the estimates are generally similar except for extra-curricular activities 
where A schools receive more funding than R and E schools.  
 
28 We find no statistically significant change in enrollment as a result of the rating shock, thus we interpret this as 
teachers changing.  
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5d. Marginal vs. Infra-marginal Schools 
  An alternative model is that schools and school districts respond to being on the margin 
of a rating, whereas which side of the border they are on is not relevant to the resource response. 
To test this idea we estimate whether being an A school that is close to either the L/A or A/R 
boundaries has a significant correlation with funding relative to being an A school that is far 
from either boundary. We also conduct a similar analysis for R schools. We consider being close 
to a boundary as being 3 or fewer students away, although results are similar using a margin of 
5.
29 These results are provided in Table 12 for TAAS and Table 13 for TAKS. While there are 
some cases where one boundary has a significant estimate, in no case does being infra-marginal 
have a clear impact on resources relative to being marginal. Hence it appears that schools and 
districts respond to the actual rating rather than treating all schools on the margin equivalently 
compared to infra-marginal schools.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
  Our objective in this research has been to establish how schools and school districts 
reallocate resources in response to accountability ratings. Using data from the state of Texas, our  
RD analysis of school on the rating boundary (defined by number of students and a single subject 
group) has found two broad results. First, we find that school districts appear to have rewarded 
success based on accountability ratings during the early, TAAS, accountability system. A 
considerable portion of these extra funds appear to have been used for extra-curricular activities 
and athletics. The second result, however, is that schools and their districts apparently did not  
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find this incentive structure useful. When Texas switched to the more rigorous TAKS system, 
these incentive effects are no longer apparent. The rating shock analysis even shows that schools 
which had a drop in rating to A were given incremental resources to bolster their instructional 
programs.  
  It is unclear why the new accountability system would engender a different response than 
the old system. One possibility is that in an environment with fixed resources, funding for 
successful schools can only come at the expense of unsuccessful schools. Further, if incremental 
resources are used for non-instructional purposes, school administrators may feel such funds are 
mis-directed. Another possibility is that the increased emphasis in TAKS on avoiding low ratings 
altered the perceived incentives on the margin.
30 A final possibility, consistent with Figlio and 
Lucas (2004), is that schools and parents have learned over time that accountability ratings poor 
predictors of school quality, and thus the ratings do not provide useful information. 
  We believe these results are an important extension to the literature on accountability, as 
they expand the discussion to consider whether resources are being channeled to the most 
effective institutions. Sonstelie and Silva (1995) find that the original school finance equalization 
lawsuit in California lead to the evisceration of the property tax system through Proposition 13, 
so that local schools are almost entirely financed by state government. If a similar process holds 
for other states as equalization spreads, it seems natural to examine whether accountability 
assists in developing an allocation system to replace the Tiebout system of population 
movement. Our research here suggests that accountability systems are not, at least in Texas, 
replacing the Tiebout process of allocating resources to the most successful institutions. 
 
29 These are provided in the online appendix. 
30 This is also consistent with avoiding low ratings from the federal No Child Left Behind law.  
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Nonetheless, accountability systems require significant resources from both state governments 
and school administrators, and if it is a general result across states that they fail to generate 
allocation responses, it may be that a superior mechanism can be formulated to replace the 
Tiebout process.  
27 
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Figure 1: Changes in Accountability Rating at Rating Boundaries
Sample is restricted to schools one rating above boundary or one rating below boundary where they miss the higher rating 
in only one subject-group.  Schools that are paired with another school, received a rating on appeal, were identified as 
receiving "special analysis", or had fewer than 200 students are also excluded.Figure 2 - Total Per-Student Expenditures in TAAS
Sample is restricted to schools one rating above boundary or one rating below boundary where they miss the higher rating in only one subject-group.  Schools that are 
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Figure 3 - Total Per-Student Expenditures in TAKS
L/A
Sample is restricted to schools one rating above boundary or one rating below boundary where they miss the higher rating in only one subject-group.  Schools that are 
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Sample is restricted to schools one rating above boundary or one rating below boundary where they miss the higher rating in only one subject-group.  Schools that are 
paired with another school, received a rating on appeal, were identified as receiving "special analysis", or had fewer than 200 students are also excluded.Low Acceptable Recognized Exemplary %  Lower  %  Same  %  Higher 
TAAS
1997-98 0.7% 55.1% 27.1% 17.2% - - -
1998-99 0.9% 51.1% 29.9% 18.2% 14.9% 66.5% 18.6%
1999-00 1.6% 45.9% 32.0% 20.5% 14.8% 64.7% 20.5%
2000-01 0.7% 38.2% 36.5% 24.7% 13.2% 61.9% 24.9%
2001-02 1.3% 31.8% 37.4% 29.5% 16.4% 58.8% 24.8%
Gap Year (2002-03)
Estimate based on 2003-04 Rules
† 9.6% 69.7% 18.0% 2.7% 63.1% 33.4% 3.5%
TAKS
2003-04
‡ 1.0% 53.4% 37.9% 7.7% 42.6% 39.8% 17.6%
2004-05 3.1% 64.3% 28.2% 4.4% 25.8% 66.9% 7.3%
2005-06 3.6% 46.6% 41.8% 8.1% 8.3% 64.2% 27.5%
2006-07 3.4% 53.6% 34.0% 9.1% 20.3% 65.0% 14.8%
Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating.  For changes the school must have received a rating in both years.  Schools that received 
ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were identified as having undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see 
text).
† Only for schools that have a regular rating in 2001-02.  We do not account for required improvement as the implementation of a new exam makes such a 
calculation inappropriate  
Table 1:  Distributions of Accountability Ratings
‡ Ratings changes are relative to 2001-02.
Rating Changes Accountability RatingYear t - 1 L A R E
L 11.3% 82.3% 6.4% 0.0%
A 2.0% 69.1% 25.5% 3.4%
R 0.1% 24.6% 53.6% 21.7%
E 0.0% 4.1% 24.6% 71.3%
LARE
L 5.6% 80.6% 12.5% 1.4%
A 1.9% 75.9% 21.3% 1.0%
R 0.2% 59.3% 38.0% 2.5%
E 0.1% 29.2% 53.8% 17.0%
Year t - 1 L A R E
L 21.8% 73.3% 4.8% 0.3%
A 4.7% 74.0% 20.9% 0.3%
R 0.2% 33.8% 57.9% 8.1%
E 0.0% 3.1% 40.5% 54.4%
Year t 
Table 2: Rating Transitions Under Different Accountabilty Regimes
C. TAKS
Last Year of 
TAAS (2001-02)
A. TAAS
Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating in both years.  Schools 
that received ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were identified as 
having undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see 
text).
Year t 
First Year of TAKS (2003-04)
B. TransitionLARELARE
% Asian 1.1 1.8 2.0 3.2 0.7 1.9 3.1 6.4
(2.3) (3.4) (4.1) (5.3) (1.5) (3.5) (5.5) (8.5)
% Black 29.5 18.6 11.1 7.1 30.2 15.6 11.0 7.3
(26.8) (22.6) (16.6) (11.7) (29.8) (19.4) (14.7) (10.2)
% Hispanic 48.4 43.8 39.4 24.5 52.6 49.3 39.6 22.0
(30.1) (31.7) (32.3) (28.6) (32.3) (31.5) (30.9) (24.7)
% White 20.8 35.6 47.1 64.9 16.4 32.8 45.9 63.9
(23.6) (29.0) (31.3) (29.1) (22.4) (29.0) (30.4) (26.1)
% Economically Disadvantaged 70.9 59.9 51.0 31.9 76.9 62.4 51.6 28.1
(22.5) (25.0) (26.4) (28.0) (19.0) (24.9) (27.2) (28.0)
% LEP 23.5 16.6 13.3 8.0 19.6 17.7 14.8 9.5
(23.1) (19.4) (17.7) (14.3) (22.3) (19.8) (18.0) (13.9)
%Special Ed 18.3 14.1 12.0 13.6 28.8 19.9 6.5 1.8
(26.4) (23.7) (23.8) (26.6) (30.4) (28.7) (17.7) (10.7)
Enrollment 812 749 633 601 781 783 606 595
(503) (502) (410) (383) (519) (567) (336) (226)
Observations 285 12,111 8,614 5,550 593 12,537 7,985 1,537
Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating.  Schools that received ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were identified as 
having undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see text).
Table 3 - School Characteristics by Rating
TAAS TAKSResources in Year t + 1
LARE LARE
Function Expenditures
Total Operating 5,520 5,075 5,152 5,159 7,023 6,219 5,926 5,674
(1,734) (1,093) (1,114) (1,341) (1,570) (1,221) (1,231) (1,000)
Instructional 3,980 3,728 3,843 3,863 4,936 4,492 4,433 4,341
(1,463) (748) (740) (880) (961) (797) (830) (687)
587 498 485 475 770 613 566 532
(267) (181) (210) (298) (278) (178) (177) (148)
Counseling 215 196 186 182 286 239 213 198
(109) (91) (85) (89) (127) (108) (98) (90)
Extra-Curricular 98 99 110 127 212 177 78 35
(162) (178) (211) (246) (314) (288) (184) (87)
Program Expenditures
Regular 2,888 2,866 3,005 3,197 3,585 3,402 3,492 3,649
(799) (653) (687) (711) (923) (822) (878) (715)
Gifted & Talented 63 72 78 91 66 79 91 108
(119) (151) (154) (172) (162) (163) (203) (240)
611 666 730 761 787 722 747 757
(269) (273) (297) (353) (398) (308) (423) (628)
842 581 531 363 1,061 721 650 400
(1,275) (437) (495) (381) (752) (548) (599) (482)
225 285 381 404 330 410 417 259
(169) (219) (247) (282) (265) (311) (343) (301)
Student - Staff Ratios 
Student - Teacher 15.2 14.9 14.7 14.7 14.0 14.6 14.8 15.2
(2.6) (2.5) (2.5) (2.5) (2.4) (2.3) (3.1) (1.7)
Student -Aide 103.1 109 94 114 108.0 107 91 105
(70.6) (152) (130) (160) (98.9) (296) (146) (96)
Student - Administrator  305.8 325 331 335 251.9 300 315 338
(125.0) (168) (198) (166) (106.3) (340) (143) (112)





Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating.  Schools that received ratings on appeal, were paired 
with another school, were identified as having undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded 
(see text). 
Table 4 - School Finances and Resoruces by Rating
TAAS (year t) TAKS (year t)
Admin & TrainingCV - Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Minus 1
CV - Optimal 
Bandwidth
CV - Optimal 
Bandwidth Plus 
1
CV - Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Minus 1
CV - Optimal 
Bandwidth
CV - Optimal 
Bandwidth Plus 
1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Low / Acceptable 603.1** 346.9 440.5* -230.2 -109.2 2.7
(305.2) (278.0) (261.8) (406.3) (359.7) (376.7)
Obs 336 525 785 1751 2353 3053
Bandwidth Below 345 567
Bandwidth Above 234 345
Acceptable / Recognized 187.9** 85.6 154.2** 9.4 -72.1 -71.4
(95.1) (68.8) (72.1) (96.4) (80.1) (69.4)
Obs 6880 8220 9086 4953 6021 6979
Bandwidth Below 234 345
Bandwidth Above 456 345
Recognized/Exemplary 70.0 154.3* 71.7 -182.0 85.8 54.2
(118.6) (93.4) (82.6) (242.2) (202.6) (156.8)
Obs 2237 3562 4535 1177 1463 1647
Bandwidth Below 234 234
Bandwidth Above 123 234
A. TAAS B. TAKS
Table 5: Regression Discontinuity:  The Effect of Rating on
Per-Student Total Operating Expenditures in Following Year
Estimate is for the intercept term for receiving a higher rating from a linear regression with the provided bandwidths.  Slopes are permitted to vary 
on either side of the cutoff.  Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating.  Marginality below the rating cutoff is defined as 
affecting only one subject-group. Schools that receive ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were identified as having undergone 
"special analysis" are excluded, as are schools with fewer than 200 students (see text).  Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low / Acceptable 346.6 7.6 -14.9 86.4*** 197.6 -35.1
(215.8) (47.1) (25.4) (25.9) (148.2) (46.8)
Obs 336 1481 765 1093 525 8402
Bandwidth Below 3 4 3 4 4 2
Bandwidth Above 2 6 4 5 3 17
Acceptable / Recognized 24.9 19.9** 10.1* 1.8 -1.8 17.9**
(46.6) (9.4) (5.3) (9.5) (43.7) (7.6)
Obs 7271 5956 7271 7173 7271 8220
Bandwidth Below 3 3 3 1 3 3
Bandwidth Above 4 3 4 5 4 5
Recognized/Exemplary 83.8 40.2* 17.1*** -5.2 62.5 -23.6*
(60.9) (20.9) (5.9) (23.2) (52.8) (12.9)
Obs 3562 2443 5128 4232 5128 4232
Bandwidth Below 3 3 3 2 3 2
Bandwidth Above 2 1 4 3 4 3

















(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Low / Acceptable -501.9*** 196.1 286.4** -1.13 15.3 -34.0
(156.7) (179.3) (122.8) (0.91) (18.8) (35.3)
Obs 97 2584 102 736 515 331
Bandwidth Below 2 3 4 2 4 3
Bandwidth Above 3 8 3 4 3 2
Acceptable / Recognized -11.1 -4.1 -32.5 -0.10 16.2 7.8
(58.3) (26.3) (48.9) (0.11) (11.1) (11.9)
Obs 853 5956 1145 4908 7112 4464
Bandwidth Below 3 3 3 1 3 3
Bandwidth Above 3 3 5 3 4 2
Recognized/Exemplary -57.9 -26.1 -31.4 0.37* -1.5 -14.0
(70.3) (30.1) (44.5) (0.22) (6.8) (15.0)
Obs 767 3562 889 3356 4293 4389
Bandwidth Below 3 3 3 2 3 3
Bandwidth Above 3 2 4 2 3 3
Table 6: Regression Discontinuity Results for Effect of Rating on Expenditures and Staffing in TAAS
Estimate is for the intercept term for receiving a higher rating from a linear regression with the provided bandwidths.  Slopes are 
permitted to vary on either side of the cutoff.  Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating. Marginality below the 
rating cutoff is defined as affecting only one subject-group. Schools that receive ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, 
were identified as having undergone "special analysiss," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see text). Robust standard 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low / Acceptable -126.7 -54.6 29.8 -122.7* 42.8 -59.5
(235.3) (46.5) (21.7) (70.5) (200.7) (52.5)
Obs 2359 3013 1278 4667 2353 3802
Bandwidth Below 7 4 7 7 6 5
Bandwidth Above 4 5 2 7 4 6
Acceptable / Recognized -83.0 0.6 20.5*** -7.2 -72.5 17.2*
(52.8) (9.4) (7.6) (19.9) (44.8) (8.9)
Obs 6021 6202 5768 5768 6202 6021
Bandwidth Below 4 5 3 3 5 4
Bandwidth Above 4 4 4 4 4 4
Recognized/Exemplary 32.8 4.0 9.1 20.6* 5.3 -24.0
(140.2) (26.7) (13.5) (10.9) (113.2) (31.2)
Obs 1463 1678 1678 1549 1334 1678
Bandwidth Below 3 3 3 2 2 3
Bandwidth Above 3 5 5 5 3 5
















(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Low / Acceptable -82.0 -96.4 -127.4 0.00 -12.4 -7.9
(146.4) (147.2) (81.7) (0.59) (17.7) (33.2)
Obs 614 1259 370 2358 2320 9091
Bandwidth Below 7 5 7 7 6 4
Bandwidth Above 4 2 2 4 4 13
Acceptable / Recognized -16.5 4.7 -120.4* 0.41*** 4.9 13.2
(59.6) (32.0) (70.4) (0.14) (5.0) (9.4)
Obs 488 6798 488 6018 7373 5975
Bandwidth Below 5 4 5 4 4 4
Bandwidth Above 3 5 3 4 6 4
Recognized/Exemplary 721.2 -77.2 506.2* 0.16 28.9*** 7.7
(439.0) (81.6) (285.3) (0.30) (9.0) (19.1)
Obs 28 1177 27 1445 1534 1668
Bandwidth Below 3 2 3 2 3 3
Bandwidth Above 5 2 4 4 4 5
Table 7: Regression Discontinuity Results for Effect of Rating on Expenditures and Staffing in TAKS
Estimate is for the intercept term for receiving a higher rating from a linear regression with the provided bandwidths.  Slopes are 
permitted to vary on either side of the cutoff.  Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating. Marginality below the 
rating cutoff is defined as affecting only one subject-group. Schools that receive ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were 
identified as having undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see text). Robust standard errors 
clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.Outcome in Year t → Enrollment Δ Enrollment 
from t to t+1 % Disadv % Black % Hispanic % White
A. TAAS
Low / Acceptable 75.7 -16 -5.1 2.2 -6.1 3.7
(98.7) (16.10) (5.5) (6.4) (7.7) (6.7)
Obs 531 381 531 531 531 531
Acceptable / Recognized 13.5 -4.2 0.1 1.9** -0.1 -2.2
(25.5) (5.30) (1.5) (1.0) (1.7) (1.7)
Obs 8252 6295 8252 8252 8252 8252
Recognized/Exemplary 73.7*** -5.2 -1.5 0.9 -0.4 -0.3
(23.6) (5.50) (1.7) (1.0) (1.8) (2.0)
Obs 3579 2570 3579 3579 3579 3579
Low / Acceptable -86.7 -13.3 2.5 1.0 4.6 -5.3
(156.8) (28.50) (4.6) (5.2) (6.8) (6.1)
Obs 2381 1578 2381 2381 2381 2381
Acceptable / Recognized 95.7*** -1.7 -0.2 -1.9* 3.7** -2.3
(22.6) (4.90) (1.6) (1.0) (1.8) (1.9)
Obs 6048 4321 6048 6048 6048 6048
Recognized/Exemplary 5.3 14.2 -0.6 -1.4 1.9 -0.8
(27.5) (10.70) (2.9) (1.4) (2.5) (2.8)
Obs 1475 945 1475 1475 1475 1475
Table 8: Tests of Discontinuities in Exogenous Variables
A. TAAS
B. TAKS
Estimate is for the intercept term for receiving a higher rating from a linear regression with the provided bandwidths.  Slopes are permitted to vary on either 
side of the cutoff.  Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating. Marginality below the rating cutoff is defined as affecting only one subject-
group. Schools that receive ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were identified as having undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 
students are excluded (see text). We use the leave-one-out cross-validation optimal bandwidths for per-student total expenditures.  See table 4 for the 
bandwidths.  Results are similar using the median optimal bandwidth across all outcomes. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, and 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimated Rating -14.9 6.9 -1.0 -2.1 4.2 38.6 -0.7
  Falls to L (34.8) (27.6) (4.7) (3.0) (3.1) (28.3) (3.2)
Estimated Rating 45.8* 45.3** 3.5 0.4 -3.3 60.0*** -3.0
  Falls to A (25.6) (20.1) (4.2) (2.4) (2.3) (21.4) (3.5)
Estimated Rating  -2.6 10.5 0.3 1.9 -3.5 16.7 -7.0*
  Falls to R (32.4) (25.2) (4.9) (3.0) (2.7) (28.3) (4.1)
Estimated Rating -15.2 -12.7 -1.4 0.0 2.2 -24.5 -8.8
  Increases (64.9) (56.9) (8.9) (5.4) (3.3) (57.4) (7.1)
Low Rating in  97.5 11.2 52.1*** 18.9** 4.1 -40.7 0.7
  2001-02 (126.1) (114.4) (17.5) (7.8) (5.1) (123.0) (8.7)
Acceptable Rating in 93.4*** 83.5*** 12.3** 5.0* -2.9 88.2*** -5.5
  2001-02 (31.7) (25.1) (5.0) (3.0) (2.9) (30.0) (3.9)
Recognized Rating in 24.4 12.9 8.2*** 3.4* 1.4 21.8 -2.9
  2001-02 (19.9) (15.0) (3.0) (1.8) (2.2) (20.5) (2.6)
Observations 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142

















(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Estimated Rating 22.3 -3.8 21.9 -0.14* 0.5 4.2
  Falls to L (22.1) (17.2) (15.7) (0.07) (3.8) (14.9)
Estimated Rating 38.4 -28.0* 20.2 -0.26*** -3.4 16.9
  Falls to A (30.2) (16.5) (18.7) (0.06) (4.6) (11.1)
Estimated Rating  6.1 -22.2 3.8 -0.22 6.9 -0.6
  Falls to R (41.2) (21.2) (22.4) (0.15) (6.3) (10.8)
Estimated Rating -150.5 -25.4 -25.4 0.14 -3.7 8.4
  Increases (141.5) (24.6) (24.8) (0.13) (5.5) (10.1)
Low Rating in  212.6 50.5 54.7* -0.41* 6.3 -1.6
  2001-02 (143.7) (59.1) (28.5) (0.22) (10.5) (20.7)
Acceptable Rating in 32.4 -49.7** 22.3 -0.26*** -2.3 6.1
  2001-02 (32.7) (24.8) (17.7) (0.08) (5.2) (13.3)
Recognized Rating in 3.6 -25.0* 5.1 -0.02 6.8 -11.5
  2001-02 (15.6) (14.4) (7.6) (0.04) (6.2) (8.3)
Observations 845 5142 845 5141 4961 5072
Table 9: "Ratings Shock" Estimates of Resouces on Ratings Changes in Transition Year
 Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating in both 2001-02 & 2003-04.  Schools that received ratings on appeal, were paired 
with another school, were identified as having undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see text). Regressions 
also include controls for % of students in each grade level, % black, % Hispanic, % Asian, % Native American, & % economically disadvantaged. 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Low -3.4 -6.4 9.6 7.2* -4.6* 51.0 -2.4
(57.5) (48.4) (10.3) (4.0) (2.6) (36.2) (5.4)
Recognized 7.0 5.1 2.9 1.9** 1.6 1.7 -0.2
(10.2) (7.5) (1.9) (0.9) (1.0) (8.2) (1.6)
Exemplary 9.5 -4.5 9.1 3.7*** 4.4*** -0.5 2.0
(17.1) (11.8) (5.8) (1.4) (1.7) (12.8) (2.4)
Observations 26,560 26,560 26,560 26,560 26,560 26,560 26,560














(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Low 2.8 -7.2 -14.2* -0.082 -7.3* -9.13
(19.2) (23.5) (8.4) (0.115) (4.3) (8.99)
Recognized -9.4 1.1 -0.9 0.010 -3.2 3.69
(6.8) (4.6) (5.3) (0.026) (2.4) (3.92)
Exemplary -7.6 -4.0 -4.3 0.003 0.0 0.26
(9.8) (6.5) (11.4) (0.036) (3.2) (4.95)
Observations 4,248 26,560 4,248 26,541 25,932 26,353
Table 10: School Fixed Effects Regressions of Resouces on Ratings - TAAS
 Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating.  Schools that received ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were identified as having 
undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see text). Regressions also include controls for % of students in each grade level, % black, % 
Hispanic, % Asian, % Native American, % economically disadvantaged, and year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Low 91.0** 51.1 22.7*** 6.9** 0.9 44.4 0.1
(42.9) (31.2) (7.4) (2.8) (3.3) (36.9) (3.0)
Recognized 4.1 0.2 1.5 0.8 -2.8** 6.3 2.1
(11.8) (8.8) (1.9) (1.1) (1.1) (12.1) (1.4)
Exemplary 41.0 29.3 -0.6 4.9* -3.7* -0.3 6.5*
(26.0) (19.0) (4.3) (2.7) (1.9) (20.2) (3.4)
Observations 23,168 23,168 23,168 23,168 23,168 23,168 23,168
















(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Low -4.3 71.2*** -14.7 -0.204*** 4.8 -23.43**
(15.6) (15.8) (11.6) (0.073) (4.1) (9.77)
Recognized 4.0 1.1 3.1 0.014 4.3 -2.47
(11.2) (5.9) (12.7) (0.038) (3.4) (6.73)
Exemplary -51.2 13.6 25.4 -0.025 5.0 0.10
(34.1) (10.6) (41.0) (0.054) (4.8) (7.83)
Observations 3,679 23,168 3,679 23,153 22,728 23,038
Table 11: School Fixed Effects Regressions of Resouces on Ratings - TAKS
 Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating.  Schools that received ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, or were identified 
as having undergone "special analysis," have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see text). Regressions also include controls for % of students in each grade 
level, % black, % Hispanic, % Asian, % Native American, % economically disadvantaged, and year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.Outcome in 











School Sample Estimate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Marginal L/A Boundary 68.9* 39.1 14.0* -0.5 3.5 62.5** -1.4
(39.4) (29.9) (8.0) (3.6) (2.6) (31.7) (3.7)
Marginal A/R Boundary 13.6 8.9 0.5 -0.9 2.5 18.5 -2.4
(20.0) (14.5) (3.2) (1.7) (1.9) (15.2) (2.2)
Observations 12111 12111 12111 12111 12111 12111 12111
Marginal A/R Boundary 11.5 15.6 -5.0 0.7 0.2 -2.7 1.6
(26.4) (17.1) (12.1) (1.9) (1.8) (17.9) (2.6)
Marginal L/A Boundary 37.6 33.7* -5.0 4.22* 2.1 34.43* 4.0
(31.0) (19.4) (15.9) (2.3) (2.6) (20.4) (3.5)
Observations 8614 8614 8614 8614 8614 8614 8614
Outcome in 

















School Sample Estimate (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Marginal L/A Boundary 73.4* 3.1 3.0 -0.05 -2.5 -0.2
(37.6) (21.0) (9.4) (0.11) (4.5) (10.1)
Marginal A/R Boundary -12.7 8.6 -1.8 -0.02 -1.4 3.8
(9.9) (9.2) (9.1) (0.08) (7.4) (4.9)
Observations 1961 12111 1961 12099 11860 12031
Marginal A/R Boundary 3.8 17.1 -5.2 0.00 2.6 -4.7
(15.9) (16.1) (16.0) (0.05) (4.9) (5.4)
Marginal L/A Boundary -10.8 -1.3 -26.9 -0.08 1.1 -9.2
(22.5) (11.5) (26.4) (0.06) (3.6) (9.4)
Observations 1231 8614 1231 8612 8433 8548
 A school is considered marginal if it is within 3 students-group-subject units of a boundary.  Results using 5 students were simliar and are provided in the online 
appendix.  Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating.  Schools that received ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were identified 
as having undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see text). Regressions also include controls for % of students in each grade level, 
% black, % Hispanic, % Asian, % Native American, % economically disadvantaged,  year dummies, and school fixed-effects.  Robust standard errors clustered by 
school in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Recognized















School Sample Estimate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Marginal L/A Boundary 48.8** 25.8 7.43* 0.7 2.8 -0.2 0.3
(22.97) (17.23) (4.03) (1.99) (2.69) (16.75) (2.18)
Marginal A/R Boundary 5.0 -10.2 3.8 4.53* -4.63* -2.3 0.0
(27.0) (19.6) (4.4) (2.6) (2.7) (19.9) (2.2)
Observations 12537 12537 12537 12537 12537 12537 12537
Marginal A/R Boundary -24.1 -16.9 -3.6 -3.5* 0.3 -23.1 0.2
(20.4) (15.1) (3.8) (2.0) (1.5) (16.7) (2.5)
Marginal L/A Boundary 27.7 22.4 0.9 -1.1 -1.0 10.4 -3.8
(34.1) (26.0) (5.1) (3.7) (2.5) (35.8) (5.1)
Observations 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985
Outcome in 
















School Sample Estimate (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Marginal L/A Boundary -3.0 23.3** 10.7 -0.05 11.0 11.6
(12.2) (9.2) (16.1) (0.05) (12.8) (18.7)
Marginal A/R Boundary 14.6 3.6 -24.06* 0.00 1.4 -4.2
(15.3) (11.8) (13.4) (0.05) (3.2) (8.3)
Observations 2183 12537 2183 12527 12341 12474
Marginal A/R Boundary -7.0 -0.2 6.3 0.16 -8.2 -0.5
(27.1) (10.4) (37.3) (0.23) (9.5) (5.1)
Marginal L/A Boundary 17.9 6.9 -31.1 -0.04 -1.4 4.2
(51.4) (27.7) (35.0) (0.08) (2.7) (7.2)
Observations 405 7985 405 7982 7803 7934
 A school is considered marginal if it is within 3 students-group-subject units of a boundary.  Results using 5 students were simliar and are provided in the online appendix.  
Sample is limited to schools that received an L, A, R, or E rating.  Schools that received ratings on appeal, were paired with another school, were identified as having 
undergone "special analysis," or have fewer than 200 students are excluded (see text). Regressions also include controls for % of students in each grade level, % black, % 
Hispanic, % Asian, % Native American, % economically disadvantaged, and year dummies.  Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Recognized
Table 13 - Regressions of Resources on Whether School Is Marginal For a Rating - TAKS
Acceptable
Recognized
AcceptableSubject Math, Reading Writing Social Studies Drop-Outs Attendance
Grades 3 - 8, 10 4, 8, 10 8 7 - 12 All
Groups
White, Black, Hisp, 
Econ Dis, All
White, Black, Hisp, 
Econ Dis, All
All only White, Black, Hisp, 
Econ Dis, All
White, Black, Hisp, 
Econ Dis, All
1998-99 40% or RI 40% or RI n/a 6% or RI 94%
1999-00 45% 45% n/a 6% 94%
2000-01 50% 50% n/a 5.50% 94%
2001-02 50% 50% n/a 5% -
2002-03 55% 55% 50% 5% -
1998-99 80% 80% n/a 3.50% 94%
1999-00 80% 80%;     3-8, 10 n/a 3.50% 94%
2000-01 80% 80%;     3-8, 10 n/a 3.00% 94%
2001-02 80% 80%;     3-8, 10 n/a 2.50% -
2002-03 80% 80%;     3-8, 10 80% 2.50% -
1998-99 90% 90% n/a 1% 94%
1999-00 90% 90%;     3-8, 10 n/a 1% 94%
2000-01 90% 90%;     3-8, 10 n/a 1% 94%
2001-02 90% 90%;     3-8, 10 n/a 1% -
2002-03 90% 90%;     3-8, 10 90% 1% -
Appendix Table 1: Requirements for TAAS Accountabiltiy Ratings
Notes:  To count, all of the subject/student group combinations must be at least either:   30 students & 10% of the student body, or 200 students (prior to 2001) / 50 




RI - Required improvement.  Schools that do not meet the requirement could get the higher rating by showing sufficient increase in the performance measure.Subject Math  Reading/ELA Writing Social Studies Science SDAA Drop-Outs Completions
Grades 3 - 11 3 - 11 4, 8, 10 8, 10, 11 5, 10, 11 3 - 11 7 - 8 12
Groups White, Black, 
Hisp, Econ Dis, 
All
White, Black, 
Hisp, Econ Dis, 
All
White, Black, 
Hisp, Econ Dis, 
All
White, Black, 
Hisp, Econ Dis, 
All
White, Black, 
Hisp, Econ Dis, 
All
All White, Black, Hisp, 
Econ Dis, All
White, Black, 
Hisp, Econ Dis, 
All
2003-04 35% or RI 50% or RI 50% or RI 50% or RI 25% or RI 50% or RI 1% or RI 75% or RI
2004-05
† 35% or RI 50% or RI 50% or RI 50% or RI 25% or RI 50% (no RI - new 
exam)
1% or RI 75% or RI
2005-06 40% or RI 60% or RI 60% or RI 60% or RI 35% or RI 50% or RI 1% (no RI - new 
calc method)
75% or RI
2006-07 45% or RI 65% or RI 65% or RI 65% or RI 40% or RI 50% or RI 2% or RI 75% or RI
2003-04 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 0.7% or RI 85%
2004-05 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% (no RI - new 
exam)
0.7% or RI 85% or RI
2005-06 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 70% or RI 0.7% (no RI - new 
calc method)
85% or RI
2006-07 75% or RI 75% or RI 75% or RI 75% or RI 75% or RI 70% or RI 0.7% or RI 85% or RI
2003-04 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 0.2% 95%
2004-05 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 0.2% 95%
2005-06 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 0.2% 95%
2006-07 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 0.2% 95%
† Although the passing rates did not increase in 2004-05 the standard for whether individual students passed did increase.
RI - Required improvement.  Schools that do not meet the requirement could get the higher rating by showing sufficient increase in the performance measure.
SDAA - State Developed Alternative Assessment - Test for certain special education students.  Passing rates based on percent of tests taken.
ELA - English Language Arts
Notes:  To count, all of the subject/student group combinations must be at least either:   30 students, or 10% of the student body, or 50 students.  Schools are also granted exceptions for for a 
certain number of low-scoring subject/group combinations based on the total number of subject/groups that count towards the rating.  Exceptions can only increase a rating from L to A.
Appendix Table 2: Requirements for TAKS Accountabiltiy Ratings
A. Acceptable
B. Recognized
C. Exemplary